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INTRODUCTION
When individuals encode and recall information, it enables 
them to record their actions in response to environmental events. 
“Only those animals which perceive time remember, and the organ 
whereby they perceive time is also that whereby they remember” 
said Aristotle (McKeon, 1941, pp. 607-608). From very early stages 
of reasoning thought time perception and memory seemed to be 
closely related.  The present project will look at how time perception 
is represented in autobiographical memory. It will further explore 
how different emotional qualities (positive, negative and neutral) of 
autobiographical memories may affect time perception. The literature 
review that follows offers a summary of background studies and a 
rationale for the present studies in this project. 
Duration estimations of past events can be highly subjective 
leading to individuals reporting accounts with variance towards the 
same event. For instance, one may recall and estimate the duration 
of an event to be shorter than it actually was, whereas, another 
individual when recalling the same event estimates its duration to be 
longer.  Remarkably, research on clinical groups found that people 
who suffer anxiety, neurotic depressives and melancholics tend to 
provide relatively small verbal estimates of time during interviews 
and psychological tests, whereas  hysterics, psychopaths, and 
maniacs provide relatively large estimates. This therefore suggests 
the fact that when a person’s inner time units are relatively large, 
their verbal estimates of time tend to be low (Orme, 1964). Hogan 
(1978) proposed a theoretical model describing the relationship 
between personality and time perception. The theory is based on 
the assumption that extraverts estimate the exposure duration to be 
longer compared to introverts in regards to complex igures. Zakay, 
Lomranz, & Kaziniz (1984) were the irst to test this hypothesis by 
assessing one hundred and thirty-two irst year psychology students 
measuring stimuli complex levels (low, medium, and high) within 
a extraversion-introversion scale using the Eysenck Personality 
Inventory (EPI; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964). Results were signiicant 
and consistent with Hogan’s (1978) hypothesis that indicated that 
extraverts do estimate the exposure durations of low and medium-
complexity stimuli to be longer than introverts. 
There appears to be a linear relationship within judgement 
duration ranging from around half a second to a few minutes (Block, 
1989). For example, one can report an event that took place a few years 
ago that took split seconds to experience, such as dislocating one’s 
knee, however, if they were to be asked how long that experience 
felt to them subjectively, their estimation could range from hours to 
days. What is interesting is what variables this estimation is reliant 
on. Results of a study suggested that health is inluenced by time 
estimation. Oyanadel and Buela-Casal (2011) assessed 50 subjects 
in a quasi-experiment and instructed them to complete the Zimbardo 
Time Perspective Inventory and the SF-36, measuring three time 
estimations. Authors found signiicant relationships between 
dimensions, physical and mental health, and time estimation, which 
thus demonstrated that health can be inluenced by time perception in 
which one implies a positive attitude towards the past, orienting the 
future, and being content with pleasant experiences.
Research would suggest that developmental factors control our 
time perception estimations. Previous studies have shown that at early 
ages of 2 to 3 years old, children begin to verbalize their past, present, 
and future (Wallace & Rabin, 1960). Levin, Israeli, and Darom (1978) 
measured the time estimation among children from nursery school. 
The task was to judge and explain which of two partially overlapping 
events began irst, ended irst, and which lasted longer. The task also 
involved interfering cues with time judgement. Results supported 
the hypothesis which showed that performance increased with age 
and decreased with interference. Therefore children’s duration 
judgements were affected by interfering cues. Similar indings were 
found by Levin (1977). Piaget claimed in the cognitive development 
stages, that during the irst stage, when children compare the duration 
of two moving bodies, they would refer longer duration to the quicker 
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body. Whereas during the second stage it switches, as children refer 
longer durations to the slower body (Levin, 1979). Hence, Levin 
examined the above claim and tested 72 children from the ages of 
four to seven years. Each child was examined by two experimenters, 
one who communicated with them and operated the equipment and 
the other who recorded the entire interview verbatim. Overall results 
indicated that there was confusion in duration due to interfering 
cues. Findings supported Piaget’s claim of children’s confusion of 
duration when interfered with cues such as, light intensity and speed. 
ATTENTION  AND TIME PERCEPTION
Zakay (1992) examined the role of attention in seven to nine year 
old children’s duration estimation. The objective was to investigate 
the distinction between prospective and retrospective time estimation 
of children in short intervals including the role of attention in only 
prospective time estimation. Two experiments were conducted. 
There were eighty children who were exposed to two types of light 
bulbs; a small bulb of low intensity and a big bulb of high intensity. 
The irst experiment revealed that prospective time estimates were 
signiicantly longer than retrospective estimations. In contrast, the 
results of the second experiment supported the research hypothesis 
indicating that when children were distracted from attending to the 
light bulbs, their estimations decreased. Zakay therefore suggested 
that these indings show that children’s prospective time perception 
processes are attentional based, similar to adults’ prospective time 
perception, whereas, their retrospective time perceptions are based 
on memory and dependent on the relative changes that occur during 
an estimated interval. The results of Block and Zakay (1997) 
provided evidence to the indings of the former study.  
Driot-Volet (2003) investigated the effect of a signal warning 
of the arrival of a stimulus to be timed on temporal discrimination 
in children aged 3, 5, and 8. The procedure consisted of two 
successive experimental phases: training and testing. In the training 
phase, participants were presented with two standard durations, 
each presented in ive alternative times. The experimenter then told 
them to focus on the shape of the circle and its duration during a 
block of 8 trials. While in the testing phase, participants received 
eight blocks of fourteen trials, 7 with and 7 without a click. The 
indings showed that there is an ability for temporal discrimination 
in children as young as 3 years, indicating that sensitivity to duration 
increases with age. Moreover, researchers have concluded that time 
discrimination improves during human development. 
Current research investigated the relation between the attentional 
resources underlying time perception and temporal order memory 
(Brown & Smith-Petersen, 2014). Participants in this study made 
judgements about temporal attributes associated with a series of 
word lists. Results demonstrated that attention to order interfered 
with duration judgements, and vice versa. Another inding was that 
there were interferences of mental workload tasks with duration and 
temporal order processing which made judgements less accurate. 
Finally, bidirectional interference was found between the temporal 
and workload tasks, which therefore suggested that there is an 
association between workload and temporal order processing. 
DURATION JUDGEMENTS AND TIME PERCEPTION
There have been numerous studies on how individuals form 
judgements on duration tasks. A classical research study found that 
older people differ signiicantly from younger people in duration 
judgements (Block, Hancock, & Zakay, 1998). This inding was 
the opposite of what was initially hypothesized, and therefore led 
authors to conclude that there are individual differences in temporal 
judgement. Experts with high domain knowledge have been found 
to report longer duration with domain-relevant information. Rhodes 
and McCabe (2009) examined the irst ever study of individual 
differences in time perception as a function of expertise. Authors 
assessed 144 psychology students from Colorado State University. 
The study consisted of three phases: familiarization, practice, and a 
testing phase. The familiarization phase gave participants the chance 
to practice making duration judgements. In the practice phase, 
participants were told to practice their ability to judge the duration of 
the words presented to them. Finally, after completing the practicing, 
participants moved to the testing phase of actual duration judgements 
and were lastly required to complete the NFL (National Football 
League) questionnaire. Results showed that there was a difference 
in judgement duration between participants with high or low levels 
of knowledge of American football for presented words that were 
either related or unrelated to American football. Those with high 
knowledge of American football had longer duration of judgement 
and less duration with unrelated words. On the contrary, participants 
with low levels of knowledge of American football did not differ 
based on football related words. Authors thus concluded experts’ 
subjective perception of time for domain-relevant information differs 
highly from that of non-experts. In other words, individuals are more 
likely to report longer duration judgements for related words than 
unrelated words. 
There are two duration estimates that researchers today refer to 
as the prospective and the retrospective paradigm. The difference 
between the two is participants acknowledged that they are required 
to judge the duration of a time period prior to beginning the task. 
Numerous studies and experiments have shown that prospective 
judgements are longer and more accurate than retrospective 
judgements (Block & Zakay, 1997), and that females are more 
focused on time in the prospective paradigm and possess greater 
episodic memory in the retrospective paradigm (Block et al., 
2000). A recent study looked at the interference between auditory 
and visual duration judgements using a temporal generalization 
paradigm (Filippopoulos, Hallworth, Lee, & Wearden, 2013). Sixty 
participants were divided into four groups: an auditory/auditory 
group, visual/visual group, visual/auditory group, and auditory/
visual group. In total, half of the participants began with long 
interference conditions and the other half began with the short one. 
After a comparison stimulus was displayed participants had to judge 
whether it was equivalent to the standard duration of the block by 
pressing the ‘Y’ (YES) or ‘N’ (NO) keys to respond. Finally, they 
completed another interference block and repeated the procedure 
four more times. Filippopoulos et al. found that when test blocks 
were alternated with interference blocks where durations were either 
shorter or longer than in test blocks, interference was found. Authors 
therefore provided the irst empirical evidence for a “common code” 
for time. Another recent study provided evidence that in Alzheimer’s 
disease (AD) patients have a deiciency in time perception, which 
results in a failure to mentally travel back in time to recollect or relive 
past events. Therefore, due to the dramatic changes that occur in the 
frontal lobes and hippocampus, AD patients perceive time as passing 
more rapidly than older and younger adults. It is evident that there is 
a mass of research that has thoroughly explored time perception and 
duration estimations. Both prospective and retrospective studies have 
in various ways revealed a relationship between memory cognitive 
functions and time estimations. Very limited studies have explored 
the relationship of time estimations and autobiographical memory.
DEVELOPMENT OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL 
MEMORY
There are two types of long-term memory (LTM): implicit and 
explicit. Implicit memories are automatic and are not accessible to 
the conscious mind, whereas explicit memories are accessible to 
consciousness, however, require effort to encode, store and retrieve. 
A child’s implicit memory develops prior to birth and is subject to 
rapid forgetting due to newly replaced experiences. The explicit 
memory develops by the irst year of life. The majority of early 
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memories are formed at 2 years of age and earlier, and remain non-
verbal even after language acquisition. Early memories are easily 
forgotten as they are nonetheless disorganized and fragmented. 
According to Howe and Courage (1997), evidence has illustrated 
that there is an improvement with age in children’s long-term 
retention performance as they have been found to retain information 
over a continuous period of time. Likewise, there is an increase in 
the ability to store and maintain information for autobiographical 
memory (AM) during early childhood.
Present theory and research has demonstrated that 
autobiographical memory develops throughout life and within 
particular social and cultural frameworks. More speciically, 
children raised by mothers who elaborately recall being with their 
children, have more detailed autobiographical memories (Fivush, 
2011). A very recent study conducted by Goddard et al. (2014) 
explored the general impact on autobiographical memory ability 
and the extent to which speciic executive processes of inhibition, 
cognitive lexibility/shifting, planning, and verbal luency impact 
on autobiographical memory ability. Authors assessed 63 children 
with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and compared them with 
63 typically developing children matched for age, gender, IQ, and 
verbal ability. All children were between the ages of 8 to 17 years. 
The current study consisted of two sessions. In session 1, participants 
completed the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI), 
BPVS, and verbal luency test followed by an interview. In the 
second session, participants were presented with stories, subsets 
and dot locations followed by a cueing task. Results showed that 
there were dificulties in retrieving speciic events for children with 
ASD, similar to the comparison group. Authors therefore suggested 
that speciic autobiographical memories are problematic in ASD and 
other psychological disorders.
THEORIES OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
Autobiographical memories are dynamic transitory mental 
constructions generated from an underlying multilevel knowledge 
base which is under control of executive processes. They are not 
like photographs, CDs, DVDs, videos, books, or any type of 
media, despite the fact that many people tend to believe that they 
are. Autobiographical memories are divided into two components: 
autobiographical knowledge and episodic memories. The former 
is conceptual or abstract knowledge about one’s life, meaning 
memories of the past, present, and future. The latter refers to speciic 
details of experienced events. Hence, autobiographical memories can 
be redeined as the transitory joining of conceptual autobiographical 
knowledge with episodic memories. The features of autobiographical 
memories are that they always consist of a perspective, whether 
it be ield or observer, and they are predominantly represented in 
the form of visual images. The self-memory system (SMS) was 
irst introduced by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) as a model 
of the relationship of AM to the self (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 
2004). This model proposed that autobiographical memories were 
the transitory mental constructions of a complex goal-driven set of 
control processes collectively referred to as the “working self”. A 
complex goal that motivates and modulates cognition, affect, and 
behaviour is a key feature of the SMS model. However, there is 
neither detail on the nature of goals nor on their relation to memory 
in the SMS. 
Conway et al. (2004, pp.504) stated that “a self-deining memory 
(SDM) is a speciic type of autobiographical memory that has the 
following attributes: affective intensity, vividness, high levels of 
rehearsal, linkage to similar memories, and connection to an enduring 
concern or unresolved conlict”. For instance, one of the authors was 
able to accurately recall where they were during the September 11th 
attack on the World Trade Centre. It could not be mentioned whether 
this memory was directly related to the conlicts that preoccupy the 
authors’ sense of identity. The memory was affective and important, 
however, it could not be considered self-deining. Hence, some 
personal memories may have the qualities of vividness and affective 
intensity ascribed to self-deining memories and may be thought 
about repetitively during one’s life due to external cues. Furthermore, 
authors have explained that these memories have an impact in mood 
regulation processes for non-depressed people.
The complex nature of memory accuracy is divided into two 
main components: coherence and correspondence. Coherence is a 
memory construction that is true in that it is consistent with other 
knowledge in memory, whereas, correspondence is a memory that 
is true to the extent that it corresponds with some past experiences. 
Moreover, all memory constructions fall on the coherence-
correspondence dimension. Our episodic representations are at the 
correspondence end, while at the coherence end, memory content 
accurately represents the self, such as, a false lashbulb memory. In 
other words, episodic memories are associated with correspondence 
constructions, whereas coherence construction is associated with 
autobiographical knowledge (Conway et al., 2004). Therefore, just 
as the brain functions to make up one’s daily experiences, it also 
makes up memories with unconscious inferences. 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES, TIME 
ESTIMATION AND EMOTIONS
In studies of memory and time, subjects have been found to 
differ in estimating the actual duration of an event and reporting how 
they subjectively felt the event lasted for. A series of experiments in 
two studies investigated (a) how normative data on the organization 
of emotions are collected and the potential situational factors 
that underlie this organization, and (b) measured reaction time to 
test how the situational knowledge, observed in the normative 
studies, is represented in memory (Conway & Bekerian, 1987). 
The participants in these experiments were from the undergraduate 
population of Cambridge University between 18 to 24 years of age. 
Seven experiments were conducted and divided into two parts, as 
mentioned previously. A major inding of this study was that there 
was a signiicant association between situational knowledge with 
both conceptual representations of emotional words and personal 
memories of emotional experiences. From the many implications 
mentioned by the authors, they suggested that a situational knowledge 
base can associate with emotions, as well as with different types 
of knowledge. Hence, the knowledge of emotions overlaps the 
effectiveness of different types of knowledge for inducing moods.  
Autobiographical memory has been shown to play a vital role in 
the recollections of personally experienced past events. Numerous 
studies and experiments have examined the effect of emotionally 
experienced events on one’s autobiographical memories, and in 
particular, individuals experiencing mental illnesses and emotional 
disorders, such as major depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD). Williams et al., (2007) pointed out that 
individuals with major depression and PTSD are unable to retrieve 
speciic memories, rather they often retrieve overgeneral memories, 
which occurs when memories are condensed together that seem to 
be frustrating, for example, if an individual often inds what they 
are looking for, but they retrieve solely the negative memories and 
squeeze them together, they would therefore perceive memories 
to be unspeciic. A recent study supported Williams et al., (2007) 
assumption that patients with major depressive disorder tend to 
retrieve overgeneral memories when attempting to retrieve speciic 
ones (Sὂderlund et al., 2014). Neuropsychological studies have 
provided evidence that that when the amygdala is combined with 
the hippocampus and the prefrontal cortex, they play a vital role 
together in retrieving emotionally experienced events (Buchanan, 
2007; Holland & Kesinger, 2010). 
Much has been mentioned of how emotional autobiographical 
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memories affect the mood of individuals. However, is there an 
association between emotional memories and time perception? 
Tipples (2008) used a bisection task on forty-two psychology 
students from the University of Hull in order to examine the inluence 
of individual differences in self-reported negative emotional arousal 
on time perception, and to follow up previous research by examining 
the effects of fearful facial expressions on time perception (Droit-
Volet, Brunot, & Niedenthal, 2004; Tipples, 2006; Effron, 
Niedenthal, Gil, & Droit-Volet, 2006; Thayer & Schiff, 1975). 
Initially, participants went through a training phase discriminating 
between “short” (400ms) from “long” (1,600 ms) stimulus durations 
followed by a test session. During the main test phase, each angry, 
fearful, happy, and neutral expression was presented for each of the 
standard (400 ms and 1,600 ms) durations. Finally they completed 
the EAS Temperament survey for Adults (Buss & Plomin, 1984). 
Results showed a signiicant positive correlation between negative 
emotionality and temporal bias due to both anger and fear, but not 
happiness. Thus, individual differences in negative emotionality 
were associated with high levels of overestimations due to both 
angry and fearful expressions, however, not with happy expressions. 
Other studies have investigated how subjective time estimation in 
individuals experiencing psychological disorders like generalized 
anxiety disorder and major depression perceive time to be slow (Bar-
Haim, Kerem, Lamy, & Zakay, 2010; Gil & Droit-Volet, 2009), or 
depending on the individual’s mind set, whether abstract or concrete, 
one can perceive time as passing quickly (Hansen & Trope, 2013). 
A previous study by Mioni, Zakay, and Stablum (2011) 
investigated temporal abilities in school age children from 4 to 8 
years old and how the environment acts on children’s subjective 
perception and experience of time. Children were divided into 
different groups. They engaged in a time reproduction task with 
static or moving vehicles (car and truck) that moved from one side 
of the computer screen to the other in 11 or 21 seconds. Participants 
were given a practice trial prior to beginning the actual experiment. 
Finally, at the end of each video, participants were instructed to 
keep pressing the space bar as long as the duration of the video 
presented. A signiicant difference was found between vehicles 
when presented for 21 seconds, whereas for 11 seconds, there was no 
signiicant difference found. In the stimuli, the car was found to be 
more under-reproduced than the truck. Hence, the longer the stimuli 
were reproduced, the higher the under-reproduction was between 
the car and truck. The previously mentioned study was recently 
replicated, this time comparing primary school children with adults 
(Mioni, Zakay, Stablum, & Grondin, 2014). Similar methods were 
carried out, however in this study, either a motorbike or a bicycle 
was presented for 11, 21, and 36 seconds. Results in Experiment 
1 found signiicant differences, where younger participants under-
reproduced the duration more than the older participants did. Thus, 
younger participants had an effect of symbolic meaning whereas older 
participants did not. In Experiment 2, four images were presented: a 
bicycle, a motorbike, a bicycle, and a motorbike driven by a person. 
Participants were required to respond with their left and right index 
inger. Results indicated that when the symbolic meaning of fastness 
was recalled, temporal intervals were under-estimated, whereas, 
when the meaning of slowness was recalled, temporal intervals were 
over-estimated. Authors suggested that the appropriate selection of 
methodology should be taken into consideration when investigating 
time perception.
Research on how individuals can recall emotional 
autobiographical memories, either positive or negative, have looked 
at their ratings of emotional intensity during that event and their 
current mood state as well as the vividness of their memories. 
Rasmussen and Berntsen (2009) conducted two studies that 
examined the characteristics of memory associated with different 
functions of autobiographical memories, speciically, how emotional 
memories (positive and negative) serve distinctive functions. 
Study 1 required participants to generate memories that it into 
three functions: directive memories and self and social memories. 
In Study 2, participants were instructed to generate their most 
emotional memories, including their most vivid lashbulb memories. 
All three memories were measured through rating-scale questions. 
The study found that positive memories were rated higher on the self 
and social functions, whereas negative memories were rated higher 
on the directive function, although directive functions were found 
to consist of the lowest ratings across both studies. Therefore, the 
two studies provided evidence that different types of memories are 
associated with different functions and that these functions can serve 
as cues to elicit speciic autobiographical memories. 
Interestingly, over the past three decades studies have 
gradually investigated whether people are able to look back in time 
and perceive themselves from a ield (irst-person) or observer 
perspective. However, further research in this ield of study is 
gradually developing. One study that examined the process of ield 
and observer perspectives during recall of one’s autobiographical 
memory replicated a classical study by Nigro and Neisser (1983) 
where they argued that many subjects claim they are able to alternate 
between ield and observer perspectives at any moment when 
recalling past events (Robinson & Swanson, 1993). Authors found 
that recent experiences were likely to recall a ield perspective, 
whereas older experiences are more likely to be recalled at an 
observer perspective. People can thus alternate between the ways 
they perceive their memories from any time in their lives. Recently, 
clinical research has tested how patients with depression tend to have 
an impairment of ield perspective when recalling positive events 
(Bergouignan et al., 2008), rather they are more likely to retrieve 
memories from an observer perspective (Kuyken & Howell, 2000). 
Furthermore, the question arises as to whether it is possible that 
individuals can perceive both ield and observer perspectives in 
emotional autobiographical memories, including neutral memories. 
It would be very interesting to investigate if positive or negative 
memories would produce overestimation or underestimation of the 
duration of the event described in the memory and whether there 
would be a difference in the perceived ield/ observer variant when 
recalling these memories.
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether 
participants could (a) recall three of their top autobiographical 
memories (positive, negative, and neutral) and offer a duration 
estimation of the event that the memory described and an estimation 
of the felt duration of the same event and (b) perceive their memories 
either as irst-person (ield), observer, or both. This study was 
a follow up of the two previously mentioned studies Nigro and 
Neisser’s (1983) and Robinson and Swanson’s (1993) studies. In 
Robinson and Swanson’s (1993) experiment, they asked participants 
to select either a ield, observer perspective or none. The present 
study was highly interested in looking at whether they are able to 
see themselves as both irst person and as an observer on all three 
conditions. The experimenter conducted this by asking them to recall 
three emotional autobiographical memories ranging from 3 to 6 years 
prior to the current study.  Two research hypotheses were proposed:
• There would be a signiicant correlation between over and 
under-estimated judgements of time estimation within all 
three emotional autobiographical memories.
• Whether emotional autobiographical memories (positive, 
negative, and neutral) would predict a difference in ield 
and observer perspective.
METHODS
STUDY-1
The pilot study was carried out to ascertain whether participants 
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would be able to recall either a positive, negative, or a neutral 
autobiographical memory dating back three to six years prior to 
the study. This study used an independent measure so that each 
participant would be asked to recall only one of the three emotional 
autobiographical memories. 
Participants
Twenty one undergraduate students at City University London 
were randomly selected to participate in the study in exchange for 
either assessment credits or chocolate. There were 11 males and 10 
females who participated. The average age was 28 years. 
Stimuli 
A Dell OPTIPLEX 9010 computer was used. The screen would 
display three Microsoft Word documents: the debrieing form, 
brieing form, and question form. A consent form was initially 
presented to them which each participant was required to complete. 
A notebook, pen, and ruler that were used by the researcher to record 
the answers. 
Design 
The current study carried a 3x2 between subjects design. The 
independent variable was autobiographical memories which were 
looked at on three levels of emotion: positive, negative, and neutral. 
The dependent variables measured were the responses to scales and 
reported time estimations. Conditions were counterbalanced by 
neutral memories. The experimental hypothesis was two-pronged, 
predicting whether there will be a signiicant correlation between 
overestimation and underestimation of time of the memories held in 
past events.
Procedure
Initially, participants were told to ill in a consent form. After 
brieing they were individually asked open-ended questions by the 
researcher. Each participant was asked to recollect one of their top 
autobiographical memories (positive, negative, or neutral) between 
3 to 6 years ago. They then had to estimate the timing of that event, 
provide both subjective and objective estimates including how 
old they were during that event. The next two questions required 
participants to rate their emotional intensity and vividness during 
recollection, using a 1 to 5 Likert scale. Finally, the last question 
asked to choose whether they were able to perceive themselves in 
that memory or event from a (a) irst-person perspective, (b) observer 
perspective, or (c) both. The task took approximately 10 minutes to 
complete. All data were written down and then recorded on an Excel 
spread sheet.
STUDY-2
The second study was similar to the pilot; however, in this study 
participants were a completely different group and were instructed 
to recall all three emotional autobiographical memories during the 
task. Therefore a repeated measure was taken to examine whether 
there would be a signiicant difference between the ield, observer 
perspective and both on all three emotional autobiographical 
memories.
Participants
Thirty nine undergraduate students at City University London 
were randomly selected to participate in the study in exchange for 
either assessment credits or chocolate. There were 23 males and 16 
females who participated. The average age was 22 years. 
Stimuli
The same as the pilot study.
Procedure
Firstly, participants illed in the consent form. The researcher then 
handed out the brieing form and carefully explained the instructions 
for the task. Participants were presented with the questions form on 
the computer screen. Contrary to the pilot study, participants on this 
study had to recollect or recall all three emotional autobiographical 
memories that occurred 3- to 6 years prior to the current study. For 
each event or memory, both subjective and objective time estimations 
were reported. Participants then rated their emotional intensity and 
vividness when recalling the past event, using the Likert scale from 
1 to 5. They were inally asked to picture or imagine themselves back 
in time during all three autobiographical events and choose whether 
they see themselves from a irst person perspective, observer 
perspective, or both. In Study 2 the task took longer than the pilot 
(roughly 10-16 minutes for each participant) as participants were 
required to report two more emotional autobiographical memories. 
Similarly to Study 1, all data were written down and then recorded 
on an Excel sheet. (See all three forms in Appendices 1, 2, & 3)
RESULTS
STUDY-1
Descriptive results
In the pilot study each participant was allocated to one emotional 
memory condition (positive, negative, and neutral). Emotional 
intensity and vividness ratings were taken. Table 1 shows the mean 
and standard deviations for emotional intensity and vividness on all 
three conditions. The means demonstrate that emotional intensity in 
positive events were quite intense (M = 3.43, SD = 1.51), whereas 
in the negative condition, events were reported to be highly intense 
(M = 4.14, SD = 1.21), compared to neutral events which were 
surprisingly intense (marginally) (M = 3.57, SD = 1.27). The 
ratings of vividness were all above the scale of three, indicating that 
memories of experienced events were very clear (Positive (M = 3.57, 
SD = 1.39), Negative (M = 4.00, SD = 1.00), and Neutral (M = 3.57, 
SD = 1.27)). 
Over and under-estimated judgements of time
There is not a statistically signiicant correlation between 
estimation of felt duration versus duration (over estimation or 
underestimation) and emotional level of autobiographical memory: 
for positive emotional memory (r = 0.471, p = 0.286), for negative 
emotional memory (r = 0.167, p = 0.465) and for neutral (r = 0.341, 
p = 0.202). An independent measure two-way ANOVA was carried 
out. The mean numbers of observer/participant/both experiences in 
the positive condition, negative condition and neutral condition did 
not differ signiicantly (t = 2.23, df = 20, p = 0.114). Figure 1 shows 
overestimation and underestimation in the three emotional level 
conditions. (See Appendix 4. for correlations).
Memory perspectives within emotional autobiographical 
memories
Most participants in this study found it dificult to immediately 
report memories that were 3 years earlier, rather they found it easier 
to recall memories that were either 4, 5, or 6 years prior to the study. 
It was shown that (4/21) students reported viewing their memories 
from a irst-person perspective, (8/21) reported being an observer in 
Table 1.
Means and Standard Deviations for Emotional Intensity and Vividness 
on each condition in Study 1.
Conditions Positive Negative Neutral
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Emotional Intensity 3.43 1.51 4.14 1.21 3.28 1.25
Vividness 3.57 1.39 4.00 1.00 3.57 1.27
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their memories, and inally, (7/21) reported seeing themselves as both 
on each condition of emotional autobiographical memories. Table 
2 illustrates the number of memory perspectives reported on each 
condition. An independent samples t-test was taken to see whether 
there was a signiicant difference between memory perspectives (irst 
person, observer, or both) in all three conditions. Analysis showed 
that t-test was found to be insigniicant, t (13) = 0.746, p >0.05. 
Memory perspectives were shown to have no signiicant differences 
within emotional memories. Figure 2 shows observer, ield, and both 
levels of perspective in recalling autobiographical memories of the 
three emotional level conditions. (See Appendix 4. for Independent 
Samples T-test)
STUDY-2
Descriptive results
In the main study a new group of participants were allocated 
to all three emotional memory conditions (positive, negative, and 
neutral). Emotional intensity and vividness ratings were taken. Table 
3 shows the mean and standard deviations for emotional intensity 
and vividness on all three conditions. The means demonstrate that 
emotional intensity in positive and negative events were reported 
to be highly intense (Positive (M = 4.04, SD = 0.88) and Negative 
(M = 4.30, SD = 0.95)), compared to neutral events which were not 
intense (M = 2.49, SD = 1.14). The ratings of vividness were all 
above the scale of 3, except for neutral memories, contrary to Study 
1 (Positive (M = 3.95, SD = 0.88), Negative (M = 4.71, SD = 1.23), 
and Neutral (M = 2.71, SD = 1.19). 
Table 2.
Number of Memory Perspectives reported on each condition in Study 1.
Conditions Positive Negative Neutral
N = 7 N = 7 N = 7
Field/First-person 1 2 3
Observer 3 3 2
Both 3 2 2
0
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Overesimaion Underesimaion
Posiive
Negaive
Neutral
Figure 1. Overestimation and underestimation in the three emotional 
level conditions.
0
1
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3
Field Observer Both
Positve
Negaive
Neutral
Figure 2. Observer/Field/Both levels of perspective in recalling 
autobiographical memories the three emotional level conditions.
Over and under-estimated judgements of time
There is not a statistically signiicant correlation between the 
estimation of felt duration versus durations (over estimation or 
underestimation) and emotional level of autobiographical memory: 
for positive emotional memory (r = 0.225, p = 0.168), for negative 
emotional memory (r = 0.208, p = 0.157) and for neutral (r = 0.431, 
p = 0.197). (See Appendix 4. for correlations)
Memory perspectives within emotional autobiographical 
memories
Table 4 illustrates the number of memory perspectives reported 
on each condition. A repeated measure two-way ANOVA was carried 
out. The mean number of observer/participant/both experiences in 
the positive condition, negative condition and neutral condition did 
not differ signiicantly (t = 22.462, df = 38, p = 0.193). Figure 3 
shows observer, ield, and both levels of participation in recalling 
autobiographical memories in the three emotional level conditions. 
(See Appendix 4. for ONE-WAY ANOVA).
DISCUSSION
STUDY-1
The objective was to examine whether there would be signiicant 
correlations between over and under-estimated judgements of time 
within emotional autobiographical memories as well as whether 
there would be a signiicant difference between the levels of 
memory perspective on all conditions using independent measures. 
However, indings of this study were found to be insigniicant 
and thus the hypotheses proposed were rejected. This therefore 
indicated that there were no signiicant correlation between over and 
under-estimated judgements of time and no signiicant differences 
between ield and observer perspective found. It was shown that 
the gap between over and underestimated judgements reported 
by participants was not as a high as expected, although more than 
half of participants provided over-estimations of time compared to 
0
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12
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20
Field Observer Both
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Negaive
Neutral
Figure 3. Observer/Field/Both level of participation in recalling 
autobiographical memories in the three emotional level conditions.
Table 3.
Means and Standard Deviations for Emotional Intensity and Vividness 
on each condition in Study 2.
Conditions Positive Negative Neutral
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Emotional Intensity 4.05 0.88 4.30 0.95 2.49 1.14
Vividness 3.95 0.88 3.71 1.23 2.71 1.19
Table 4.
Number of Memory Perspectives reported on each condition in Study 2.
Conditions Positive Negative Neutral
N = 39 N = 39 N = 39
Field/First-person 13 9 17
Observer 20 11 8
Both 16 12 11
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under-estimations. There were individual differences in how they 
looked back in time and perceived themselves; nevertheless, in all 
three emotional conditions participants were able report a memory 
perspective of seeing themselves during retrieval. Moreover, each 
condition in this study illustrated that participants were emotionally 
intense and that their memories were vivid so they did what they 
were asked. 
STUDY-2
This study predicted the same hypotheses and was in fact the 
actual experiment itself, using repeated measures. Similarly to Study 
1, results of this study were found to be marginally insigniicant. 
Therefore, even with a larger group of participants where each 
participant undertook all three conditions, no signiicant correlations 
were found and neither were there any signiicant differences 
between memory perspectives found within emotional memories. 
Furthermore, within all three conditions, participants showed no 
differences in their objective and subjective duration judgements of 
the original events and whether they perceived them to be irst-person, 
observer, or even both. Nonetheless, during the negative condition, a 
large amount of participants reported looking back at their memory 
and seeing themselves in a irst person or ield perspective, compared 
to observer perspective or both. In addition, positive and negative 
conditions indicated that participants were highly emotionally 
intense and that their memories were exceedingly clear, compared to 
the control condition (neutral).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Summary of indings
Overall, the sole aim of the research was to investigate the 
relationship between time perception and emotional interference on 
autobiographical memories. Two studies were conducted, one pilot, 
the other was the actual experiment. The pilot used an independent 
measure whereas the second study used repeated measures. Both 
studies were found to be insigniicant. Therefore, (a) there were no 
signiicant correlation between over and under-estimated judgements 
of time estimations within emotional autobiographical memories and 
(b) no signiicant difference was found between memory perspectives 
in all three conditions. There were individual differences with regards 
to memory perspectives as many participants seemed to be able to 
perceive both ield and observer perspectives in one recollected 
memory. However, some were only able to view themselves from 
a ield and others only from an observer perspective in all three 
conditions. In short, despite insigniicant results, participants in both 
studies were able to provide evidence to some extent that emotional 
autobiographical memories can interfere with the perception of time. 
Reference to previous research
The results of this research showed no distinction between over 
and under-estimated judgements of time in all levels of emotional 
autobiographical memories. However, as Tipples (2008) found 
increased levels of over-estimation due to negative emotionality 
expressions but not with happy expressions, the current research 
showed consistency in that during both studies, when participants 
recalled negative emotional autobiographical memories there were 
also high levels of over-estimated judgements of time. This inding 
supported recent studies in the pattern of overestimated judgements 
due to emotional personal memories (Droit-Volet et al., 2004; Effron 
et al., 2006). Emotional interference was shown to have an impact 
on experienced and recalled time estimation of autobiographical 
events which were parallel to Block and Zakay’s (1997) inding that 
several variables can inluence experience duration and remembered 
duration.
Robin and Swanson (1993) reported that the experienced 
intensity of memories tended to decrease when retrieving memories 
that were more of an observer perspective, whereas, there were 
no changes of experienced intensity during the converse shift. In 
the second study of the current research, participants were vastly 
subjective when reporting emotional intensity and from what type 
of perspective they viewed themselves which led to individual 
differences, as many were highly intense during both positive 
and negative conditions and in memory perspectives. It was 
demonstrated in this research that memory perspectives between 
irst person, observer, or both perspectives did not differ within 
emotional autobiographical memories. Memories of events that 
focused on feelings and negative emotions led to a ield perspective 
of the memory (Nigro & Neisser, 1983). More than half of the 
participants during the negative autobiographical memory condition 
reported looking back at the event in a irst-person perspective. This 
inding, however, contradicted the indings of Kuyken & Howell 
(2000) who reported that adolescents with depression were likely to 
retrieve memories from an observer point of view. In both studies, 
the likelihood of participants retrieving positive memories in a ield 
or irst-person point of view was quite low, particularly in the pilot 
study, which proved as evidence to Bergouignan et al., 2008 in that 
ield perspectives  impair retrieving positive memories. 
An important inding was that the majority of participants 
were able to view themselves from both a ield and an observer 
perspective during recall of a positive autobiographical memory. 
Studies that sought to investigate the point of view that participants 
would report during the retrieval of personal memories gave the 
selection of either observer, ield perspective, or neither of the two 
(Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Robinson & Swanson, 1993). Interestingly, 
the current research was the irst to look if participants were able to 
perceive themselves as both in a particular event on each condition. 
In other words, participants were asked in the inal question to select, 
when looking back at that emotional memory, whether they see 
themselves in a (a) irst-person (ield) perspective or (b) observer 
perspective, or (c) as both. There were a group of participants in the 
second study who were able to select both on all three conditions, as 
well as there were high reports of both during the positive condition. 
This signiicant inding indicates that individuals are able to alternate 
their memory perspectives in a single recollected event.
Limitations 
One of the main limitations of the study was the lack of control 
on the subjective and objective judgements of time estimations on 
all levels of emotional autobiographical memories as the differences 
between them varied widely and caused confusion. The use of a 
PC to display the questions, brieing, and debrieing forms helped, 
however, this limited the research to only a computer lab rather 
than using forms to conduct studies outside as this research was not 
computer-based.
Suggestions and implications for future study
As mentioned earlier both hypotheses in both studies were 
found to be insigniicant which led to the suggestion that individuals 
slightly differ in over and under-estimating judgements of time 
during the retrieval of emotional events and that when retrieving 
positive memories, individuals view them from an observer point 
of view, whereas, individuals report seeing their negative memories 
in a ield perspective during retrieval. For future study, it would be 
highly crucial that participants are clear about the type of emotional 
memory sought prior and during the study and that subjective and 
objective judgement of time estimations are as accurate as possible 
and controlled in order to avoid confusion and errors in data analysis, 
although subjectivity can be dificult to control. Finally, as this 
research used PC screens in computer labs to display the forms, it 
would be preferable that replicated or follow-up research used forms 
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for the questions, brieing, and debrieing rather than computers as 
this would be easier to conduct. In addition, an important implication 
would be either to use repeated measures where all participants 
undergo all conditions of the study or use the same methods to 
conduct further research on prospective and retrospective duration 
paradigms as prospective judgements were found to be longer than 
retrospective judgements (Block & Zakay, 1997), as well as using a 
larger number of participants. 
CONCLUSIONS
To summarise, indings failed to prove both hypotheses in the 
two conducted studies. There were no major gaps between over and 
under-estimation of duration judgements. In each condition, all three 
levels of memory perspective that were selected demonstrated the 
ability for mental time travel and to look at one’s self in either a 
ield, observer perspective or both in a single retrieved event. For 
future study, an important recommendation would be the control 
of time estimations between the objective (actual) duration of the 
event and, in particular, the subjective duration judgements made 
by participants. Furthermore, regardless of the insigniicant indings, 
this research to some extent suggests that emotional interferences 
and time perception, under speciic experimental methods may have 
an inluence on one’s autobiographical memory suggesting a great 
demand for further study on the topic of time perception.
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